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Abstract
We often speak as if there are merely possible people – for example,
when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to
be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a
person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible peo-
ple serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us
some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without com-
mitting ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that
such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive
resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then
argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages
only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of prop-
erties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies and argue that
none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be para-
phrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary
what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individu-
als there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on
the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties
there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical and having
properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all.
We often find ourselves speaking of things there could have been, as much
in everyday life as when doing philosophy. We talk about buildings that could
have been built but never will be, and of children who could have been born
but never will be. Yet in other moods we are inclined to deny that there are
any such things. Surely nothing that could be a building fails to ever be one,
and nothing that could be a person fails to ever be one. So our opinions appear
inconsistent: We appear committed both to there being and to there not being
things that could have been people but never are. Which is it?
Philosophical orthodoxy sides with non-being: Nothing that could be a per-
son fails to ever be one. If this is right, then the distinctions that we cognize and
communicate when we unreflectively speak of things which could have been peo-
ple but never are must be understood in other terms. For such distinctions are
clearly intelligible. Consider the opening lines of Richard Dawkins’ Unweaving
the Rainbow :
We are going to die, and that makes us the lucky ones. Most people
are never going to die because they are never going to be born. The
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potential people who could have been here in my place but who
will in fact never see the light of day outnumber the sand grains of
Arabia. Certainly those unborn ghosts include greater poets than
Keats, scientists greater than Newton. We know this because the set
of possible people allowed by our DNA so massively exceeds the set
of actual people. In the teeth of these stupefying odds it is you and
I, in our ordinariness, that are here. (Dawkins, 1998, p. 1)1
What Dawkins is getting at when he says that most people are never going to
be born is clearly not obviously false. Yet it is surely false that most people are
never going to be born: Every person has been born. So if we wish to speak
perspicuously while communicating what he is communicating, we will have to
paraphrase him. His talk of ‘potential people’ and ‘possible people’ suggests
that we paraphrase him as saying that most possible people are never going
to be born. But according to philosophical orthodoxy, this paraphrase is little
improvement, since all possible people (i.e., things which could have been people)
have been (or will be) people, and so have been (or will be) born. The orthodox
position therefore faces a paraphrase challenge: to say what substantive claim
Dawkins is making without in so doing saying that there are merely possible
people (things which could have been people but never are). The challenge is an
urgent one. If it cannot be met, then we will have no choice but to take Dawkins’
talk of merely possible people at face value, and thus, as we will argue, accept
that it is a necessary matter what things there are.2
The aim of this paper is two-fold. The first aim is to formulate the challenge
illustrated using Dawkins’ quote in a general and precise way; this is done in
section 1. The second aim is to explore strategies for how the challenge might
be met. Section 2 considers paraphrase strategies available in first-order modal
languages, and argues that even given highly infinitary resources they fail to
meet the challenge. In section 3 we show that the challenge can arguably be
met by moving to a higher-order modal language, but only given one of two
controversial views. The first of these views holds that it is necessary what
properties there are. The second holds both that necessarily co-extensive prop-
erties are identical and that properties of properties can apply to properties
which there could not even possibly be. In section 4 we argue that anyone en-
gaged in the project of paraphrase must accept one of these heterodox views,
since all other paraphrase strategies are problematic. Assuming that Dawkins
is making a substantive claim which can be stated explicitly, we conclude with
1Merely possible people also figure prominently in ethical debates about the so-called ‘non-
identity’ problem. See Parfit (1984, chapter 16), Hare (1988), and Hare (2007).
2We have slightly oversimplified the orthodox position, which ought to be compatible with
the claim that some future machines will count as people and so be people that are never
born. What the orthodox position is committed to is that anything that could be a person is
at some time a person. (Our ascription of orthodoxy is based on the sociological observation
that Williamson’s (2013) view that there actually are things that could have been people yet
are never born (e.g., Wittgenstein’s possible children) has mostly been met with incredulity.)
One might think that human zygotes that fail to develop are merely possible people, on
the grounds that people are identical to human organisms that were zygotes before they were
people (and hence people are not essentially people). Those who accept such views should
replace our talk of merely possible people with talk of merely possible organisms. Fine (2005b)
defends the eccentric view that you would still have been a person had you not been born; we
can sidestep this dispute by replacing talk of possible people with talk of possible children,
since everyone, including Fine, agrees that you would not have been a child had you never
been born.
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a trilemma in section 5: Either our challenge cannot be met, in which case we
have no choice but to accept that it is a necessary matter what individuals there
are, or it can be met but only via one of the higher-order paraphrase strategies,
in which case one of the two controversial views mentioned above concerning
the metaphysics of properties must be true. Despite its disjunctive nature, this
conclusion is striking, since most contemporary metaphysicians reject all three
of its disjuncts. An appendix establishes the technical results appealed to in
section 2; the technical results appealed to in section 3 are proved elsewhere.
1 The paraphrase challenge
1.1 Formulating the challenge
Dawkins’ quote provides one example of the sort of discourse that, according
to orthodoxy, cannot be taken at face value, and hence, given that we use it to
sensibly convey precise ideas about modal reality, must admit of some sort of
paraphrase. But there are a host of similar sentences equally in need of para-
phrase if orthodox metaphysics is to be maintained. The challenge, then, is to
come up with a systematic paraphrase for all such sentences, rather than ad hoc
paraphrases for particular examples. Three aspects of this paraphrase challenge
need to be clarified: (1) Which sentences are in need of paraphrase? (2) What
does it take for one sentence to count as a paraphrase of a given sentence in
need of paraphrase? (3) What counts as a systematic paraphrase strategy?
(1): The expression ‘most’ used by Dawkins is an instance of a well-studied
family of variable-binding operators known as generalized quantifiers, other ex-
amples of which include the existential and universal quantifiers familiar from
first-order logic, ‘there are n things such that . . . ’, ‘there are infinitely many
things such that . . . ’, and ‘there are uncountably many things such that . . . ’.3
In logic and formal semantics, generalized quantifiers are taken to express struc-
tural constraints on the pattern of satisfaction of the conditions expressed by
the formulas whose variables they bind. But in Dawkins’ quote and in relevantly
similar discourse, generalized quantifiers seem to express structural constraints
on the pattern of satisfaction of those conditions by all possible individuals. For
the purposes of this paper, we understand the paraphrase challenge to apply
to all such modalized uses of generalized quantifiers. In delineating the scope
of our challenge in this way, we rely on the one hand on established usage of
the term ‘generalized quantifier’ in linguistics and logic, and on the other hand
on paradigmatic examples such as Dawkins’ quote as well as further examples
given below to settle what we call a ‘modalized use’ of such a quantifier.4
(We should note that, although throughout this paper we will engage in
the very modalized quantification that we are exploring strategies for eliminat-
ing, such talk will not figure in any of the paraphrases we will be considering
3We are using ‘most’ in the logician’s sense, on which ‘most F s are Gs’ means that there are
more F s that are Gs than F s that aren’t Gs. See Westerst˚ahl (2011) for a concise introduction
to generalized quantifiers.
4Although we limit the challenge to generalized quantifiers here, this is not because we think
that the challenge only arises though generalized quantifiers, but only to give the challenge
specific boundaries. There are other paraphrase challenges; for example, the challenge to make
sense of modalized plural quantification. Goodman (2016) argues that the paraphrase strategy
sketched in section 3.2 does not generalize to the plural case.
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and so is not objectionable. We will, however, deliberately refrain from theo-
rizing in terms of ‘possibilia’ that ‘exist’ only in ‘non-actual possible worlds’.
We agree with Williamson (2013, chapter 1) that such formulations at best ob-
scure the most productive questions in their vicinity – namely, questions that
can be formulated in the language of quantified modal logic, on an unrestricted
interpretation of its quantifiers and a metaphysical interpretation of its modal-
ties (see section 1.2). In particular, ‘possible worlds’-talk prejudices the issues of
higher-order contingency discussed in section 3.3; see Williamson (2013, chapter
6) and Stalnaker (2012, chapter 2).)
(2): For a given sentence S involving a modalized use of a generalized quan-
tifier, we will count a sentence P as a paraphrase of S just in case P expresses
the proposition conveyed by S – at least up to a fairly demanding standard of
‘metaphysical equivalence’, as discussed in section 1.3 (for brevity, this qualifi-
cation will usually be left tacit). This proposition need not be the proposition
(literally) expressed by S, at least not on the interpretation of its quantifiers
and modalities at issue when orthodox metaphysicians say ‘There are no merely
possible people’. We will assume that, in many cases, we understand su ciently
well which proposition is being conveyed by a modalized use of a generalized
quantifier to make firm judgements about whether a proposed paraphrase ex-
presses that proposition.
(3): Any successful answer to the paraphrase challenge must be systematic, in
the sense that it should not require any ingenuity to apply in any specific case.
Considering only finitary languages, one could try to make this requirement
formally precise using the tools of recursion theory, but since we will discuss
languages with expressions of infinite length, we cannot do so here. However,
for the purposes of evaluating the strategies to be discussed below, it su ces to
informally state that any successful strategy must constitute an algorithm that
cares only about the form of the sentences being paraphrased.5
The general challenge can now be summed up as follows:6
Paraphrase Challenge: Provide a systematic strategy that, for any
sentence involving modalized quantification, produces a new sentence, not
involving modalized quantification, that expresses the proposition con-
veyed by the original sentence.7
Admittedly, this is all very abstract; a range of further examples illustrating
this challenge will be given in section 2.
1.2 Context sensitivity
Both quantifiers and modal adverbs breed context-sensitivity, in that sentences
containing them can be used literally to express di↵erent propositions on di↵er-
5One could strengthen this requirement by demanding that the strategy be compositional,
in the sense that the paraphrase of a sentence ' must occur as a subformula of the paraphrase
of any sentence  of which ' is subformula. But this demand strike us as unduly restrictive:
Russell’s celebrated theory of descriptions, after all, fails to be compositional in this sense.
6Fine (2003), Leuenberger (2006) and Williamson (2010, 2013) raise similar challenges.
Lewis (2004), Sider (2006) and Szabo´ (2006) raise analogous challenges for tensed quantifiers.
But note that the way we conceive of our paraphrase challenge di↵ers substantially from the
ways in which most of the aforementioned authors conceive of their respective challenges.
7To be clear: it is particular uses of (interpreted) sentences, as opposed to sentence types,
that do or don’t involve modalized quantification, and such modalization may characterize
some but not all occurrences of generalized quantifiers in the relevant sentences.
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ent occasions of use. So perhaps we speak truly both when in unreflective moods
we utter ‘Most possible people are never going to be born’ and when in more
metaphysically minded moods we utter ‘There are no merely possible people’.
We therefore stipulate that in the formulation of the paraphrase challenge the
context-sensitivity of ‘there are’ and ‘possible’ in the paraphrasing sentences
should be resolved uniformly with the way in which orthodox metaphysicians
resolve it when they utter ‘There are no merely possible people’ – call this the
orthodox interpretation.
Why is it an urgent challenge to provide such a paraphrase? Because it
is widely agreed that there is a particular way in which we should uniformly
resolve the context-sensitivity of our quantifiers and modal adverbs when we
do metaphysics.8 It follows that when engaging in metaphysical theorizing we
cannot accept both of the above two sentences as literally true. Since orthodox
metaphysicians accept ‘There are no merely possible people’ as literally true,
they cannot likewise accept ‘Most possible people are never going to be born’.
So they must provide some other way of making sense of the claim that we
would normally communicate by uttering the latter sentence, and do so holding
fixed the meaning of their quantifiers and modal adverbs.
One might also appeal to phenomena such as vagueness or ambiguity to un-
dermine the assumption that the uses of sentences we claim to be in need of
paraphrase convey a single proposition to be expressed by a paraphrasing sen-
tence. Alternatively, one might simply deny that these uses succeed in conveying
any propositions other than the ones they literally express on the orthodox inter-
pretation. We think that the partial success of various paraphrase strategies to
be explored below shows that these views are mistaken. For a wide range of cases
of modalized quantification, paraphrase strategies can be found which plausibly
satisfy the requirements laid down above. In these cases, not only does it seem
that a particular proposition is conveyed, but we seem to be able to express it
using an orthodoxly-interpreted sentence that means something di↵erent than
the original sentence would mean on the same interpretation. Since these cases
are relevantly similar to other cases of modalized quantification, we conclude
that allowing us to convey such propositions is a general feature of modalized
quantification, regardless of the quantifier in question.
(One might think that our paraphrase challenge can be met on the cheap by
introducing new quantifier-like expressions whose semantic contribution to the
sentences in which they occur is stipulated to make those sentences literally ex-
press the propositions that would be conveyed by corresponding modalized uses
of the corresponding sentences containing unrestricted quantifiers. But given
the present dialectic, the important question is whether such a stipulation could
succeed on the assumption that the paraphrase challenge cannot be met in any
8On quantifiers, see Williamson (2003), Dorr (2005), and Sider (2009); on modal adverbs,
see Kripke (1980 [1972]) and Plantinga (1974). For general discussion of such metametaphys-
ical issues, see the papers in Chalmers et al. (2009). The methodological assumption about
quantifiers has recently been questioned under the heading of ‘ontological pluralism’; see Mc-
Daniel (2009) and Turner (2010). Someone sympathetic to ontological pluralism might, in the
present setting, suggest that quantifiers come in two fundamental families – ‘actualist’ and
‘possibilist’ – such that, for example, mostp things that are possibly people are never going to
be born, yet everythinga that is possibly a person is at some time born. The strategy rejects
the paraphrase challenge by positing an ambiguity: modalized quantification just is possibilist
quantification. We won’t consider such views here, other than to note that the considerations
in footnote 9 tell against the most obvious version of the picture.
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other way, and this strike us as highly implausible.9)
1.3 The standard of paraphrase
Understanding the paraphrase challenge in terms of propositional identity will
likely be rejected by those who accept fine-grained theories of propositions that
would render the challenge so construed hopelessly demanding. It would be
natural for friends of such views to instead understand the challenge in terms
of some relation of ‘metaphysical equivalence’ between propositions, such as
corresponding to the same state of a↵airs. For example, proponents of structured
propositions will distinguish the proposition that Hesperus is a planet from the
proposition that Hesperus is a planet and Hesperus is a planet, and Fregeans
will distinguish the proposition that Hesperus is a planet from the proposition
that Phosphorus is a planet, but everyone ought to recognize a sense in which
these propositions make the same demands on reality. All of what follows could
be reframed in terms of such a notion, although for brevity we will continue to
frame the paraphrase challenge in terms of propositional identity.
One might wonder whether anything interesting can be said about our para-
phrase challenge without making substantial assumptions about propositional
granularity. In particular, one might wonder whether the challenge becomes triv-
ial on a su ciently coarse grained theory of propositions. To see that it does not,
consider the extensionalist view according to which there are only two propo-
sitions: the True and the False. On this view, the propositions conveyed using
modalized quantifiers can clearly be expressed in all sorts of other terms. But
answering the paraphrase challenge requires a systematic paraphrase, which is
only sensitive to the form of the sentences being paraphrased (understood as
including facts about which quantifier-occurrences are modalized). And exten-
sionalism suggests no such algorithm. (It is worth noting that certain eccentric
metaphysical views would support systematic paraphrases given the assump-
tion that propositions are individuated modally. For example, if one thought
that there were only finitely many possible contingent beings, then one should
9The technical results discussed in section 3.6 also entail that the resulting view would
have some pretty unattractive features. There we show that, given natural assumptions, con-
tingency in which properties and propositions there are entails that we cannot use the re-
sources of higher-order modal logic to meet the paraphrase challenge for the quantifier ‘there
are uncountably many’. Since, as we argue in section 3.2, the paraphrase challenge can be
met using the resources of higher-order modal logic if it is not contingent what properties and
propositions there are, and we are presently exploring the prospects of introducing ‘primitive’
modalized quantifiers on the assumption that the challenge cannot be met in that way, let
us consider the prospects of the primitivist strategy on the assumption that the modalized
‘there are uncountably many’ cannot be defined using the resources of higher-order modal
logic. Now observe that modalized existential and universal quantifiers of all orders can be
defined in such a setting, using the strategy from section 2.1. So not only will modalized ‘there
are uncountably many’ not be explicable using unrestricted quantifiers and modal operators,
but it will also not be explicable using modalized higher-order quantifiers in the way that the
unrestricted ‘there are uncountably many’ is standardly explicated in higher-order terms. This
leaves proponents of the primitivist strategy in an awkward position. For example, presumably
they will want to accept the validity of ‘If modalized-most F s are Gs, and modalized-there-
are-uncountably-many F s, then modalized-there-are-uncountably-many Gs’. But unlike in the
case of unrestricted quantification, where the corresponding schema is a theorem of higher-
order logic when the quantifiers ‘most’ and ‘there are uncountably many’ are replaced with
their higher-order definitions, the proponent of primitivist modalized quantifiers would seem
to have no account of the validity of the modalized schema, since the modalized quantifiers will
not by their lights admit of any corresponding definitions in modalized higher-order terms.
6
be able to systematically paraphrase all modalized generalized quantifiers in a
first-order modal language with infinitary conjunction. But this sort of modal
finitism is wildly implausible.)
Finally, it is important to clearly distinguish our paraphrase challenge from
a related challenge that might be suggested by our technical appendix and by
much of the related literature: namely, to produce a paraphrase that is logically
equivalent to the sentence being paraphrased. The idea is to imagine a language
with two versions of every quantifier, one ‘modalized’ and the other ‘orthodox’,
and then try to produce a function that maps every sentence of this language to a
logically equivalent sentence not containing any modalized quantifiers. Whether
or not this proposal comes apart from ours depends in part on how to understand
the contested notion of logical equivalence. The challenges as we have formulated
it sidesteps that thorny question.
1.4 Model theory
To formulate paraphrase strategies with su cient generality and precision we
need to work with formal languages. Having done so, we can then use possible-
worlds model theory to get some evidence regarding the success of a proposed
paraphrase strategy. To do so, we formulate both the sentences in need of para-
phrase and the sentences that are supposed to paraphrase them in a formal
language interpreted over such models. In doing so, it is of course essential that
the relevant languages include expressions formalizing the modalized uses of
generalized quantifiers occuring in sentences to be paraphrased. We can then
see whether, as far as the model theory is concerned, a given sentence in need of
paraphrase conveys the proposition expressed by a given sentence o↵ered as its
paraphrase, by seeing whether the two sentences are true in the same models.
This standard must be applied cautiously, since being true in the same models
is not obviously equivalent to conveying the same proposition. But it is at least
something of a guide, in a sense that can be made precise as follows.
Call a class of models probative just in case, for any two sentences interpreted
over those models, the two sentences convey the same proposition only if they
define the same class of those models.10 In the case of sentences containing
no modalized quantifiers, the proposition conveyed will just be the proposition
literally expressed on the orthodox interpretation. From the assumption that
a given class of models is probative, we can argue that a proposed paraphrase
is inadequate by showing that some sentence in need of paraphrase and its
proposed paraphrase define di↵erent classes of models: by probativity, it follows
that the proposition the former conveys is distinct from the proposition the latter
expresses, and so the paraphrase challenge has not been met. More generally, we
can argue that a certain sentence has no paraphrase in a given formal language
by showing that no sentence of that language defines the same class of models as
the sentence in need of paraphrase defines. The model-theoretic results appealed
to in sections 2 and 3 are of this form.
10More precisely: any interpretation of the non-logical constants of the language determines
a function from sentences of the language to the propositions conveyed by those sentences,
and a class of models is probative for that language just in case, for any interpretation of its
non-logical constants, two sentences convey the same proposition on this interpretation only
if they define the same class of models, where the class of models defined by a sentence is the
class of models in which it is true.
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Probative classes of models do not straightforwardly give us a way of arguing
that a given paraphrase is adequate.11 But we can still use probative classes
of models as a heuristic in assessing the adequacy of candidate paraphrases, to
be supplemented by independent judgments of propositional granularity. Every
probative class of models provides a necessary condition of adequacy on any
candidate paraphrase strategy. Satisfying such conditions is non-trivial, and so
provides substantial, though defeasible, evidence for a strategy’s adequacy.
The classes of models appealed to below are versions of the variable do-
main possible-worlds models first developed by Kripke, on which it is relatively
straightforward to interpret modalized generalized quantification. Some neces-
sary truths, such as the claim that there are at least two possible things and the
claim that there are at least three possible things, di↵er with respect to which
such models they are true in. Necessarily equivalent sentences might therefore
define di↵erent classes of models. Those who think that any necessarily equiva-
lent sentences express the same proposition therefore cannot accept these classes
of models as probative. But the relevant classes of models can still be used to
give substantial, though defeasible, evidence for a strategy’s inadequacy, by sug-
gesting that no systematic paraphrase is available, for the reasons mention in
section 1.3.
2 First-order paraphrases
The expressive resources of standard first-order modal logic provide the re-
sources to answer the paraphrase challenge in a certain restricted range of cases.
To help illustrate our abstract challenge and to delineate precisely how far such
solutions go, we will start with some simpler modalized generalized quantifiers.
We return to Dawkins’ quote at the end of this section. When considering a cer-
tain formal language, we will say that the paraphrase challenge can be met for a
certain generalized quantifier just in case for every sentence in this language in
which the only modalized quantifier occurring in it is the modalization of that
quantifier, there is a sentence in this language containing no modalized gener-
alized quantifiers which paraphrases it. For further details, see the appendix,
section A.1.
2.1 A possible knife
In a knife factory there is a spare handle and a spare blade. No knife will ever
be made using either of them. Nevertheless, we might naturally say that there is
a possible knife that could have been made from this blade and handle had the
two been joined.12 But if, in keeping with metaphysical orthodoxy, we wish to
deny that there are any such possible knives, then this claim, like Dawkins’, is in
11Such an argument would require an individuating class of models: one such that, on any
interpretation of their non-logical constants, any two sentences that define the same class
of models convey the same proposition. Assuming our language contains classical Boolean
connectives, there could only be such a class of models if the class of conveyable propositions
forms a Boolean algebra, a hypothesis we don’t want to presuppose.
12Where it is clear from context, we will use ‘possible 's’ as shorthand for ‘possible things
that are possibly '’ and ‘merely possible 's’ as shorthand for ‘possible things that are possibly
' and never '’. On this usage, Saul Kripke is a merely possible circus performer.
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need of paraphrase. Luckily, the following paraphrase is available: It is possible
for there to be a knife made by joining this handle and this blade.
2.2 Two possible knives
In the knife factory there is a spare handle and two spare blades. No knife will
ever be made using any of these materials. Nevertheless, we might naturally say
that there are two possible knives that could be made by joining the handle
with one of the blades.
The most flatfooted generalization of the paraphrase strategy from the pre-
vious section will not work: It is not possible for there to be two knives made
by putting together these materials, since the handle would have to be part of
both knives at once, which is impossible. A di↵erent strategy is needed. Luckily,
the following paraphrase is available: It is possible for there to be a knife made
by joining this handle with one of these blades such that it is possible for there
to be a di↵erent knife made by joining this handle with one of these blades.13
This strategy generalizes to cases with any finite number of spare blades.
In general, we can paraphrase the claim that there are n possible knives that
could be made from these materials by embedding n occurrences of the phrase
‘it is possible for there to be a knife made from these materials’ in each other:
It is possible for there to be a knife x1 made from some of these materials
such that it is possible for there to be a knife x2 distinct from x1 made from
some of these materials such that . . . it is possible for there to be a knife xn
distinct from each of x1 . . . xn 1 made from some of these materials. Unlike the
flatfooted generalization of the paraphrase strategy from the previous section,
we need not assume that it is possible for there to be more than one object
that is possibly a knife made from some of these materials. In other words, the
strategy is compatible with the pairwise incompossibility of the nmerely possible
knives. We achieve this compatibility by interleaving n possibility operators and
n existential quantifiers.
Notice that the claim that these merely possible knives are pairwise incom-
possible is stronger than the claim that, necessarily, no two of them are knives.
One might think that, necessarily, everything that is possibly a knife is at some
time a knife, without thinking that, necessarily, everything that is possibly a
knife is a knife. On such a view, it might be possible for there to be all of the
merely possible knives after all, were the handle joined with each of the blades
one after another. One might think that it is therefore unnecessary that our
paraphrase strategy be compatible with pairwise incompossibility. Why not in-
stead use the simpler paraphrase: It is possible for there to be n things each of
which is at some time a knife made from some of these materials? The prob-
lem is that the proposal doesn’t generalize: there are two possible dishes – an
omelette and a sou✏e´ – that I could make from these eggs, but it is not possible
that at some time I make an omelette from these eggs and at another time I
make a sou✏e´ from these same eggs. So we need paraphrases compatible with
pairwise incompossibility.
13Throughout this paper cardinality quantifiers should be understood as claiming that there
are at least the relevant cardinality of things. In particular, we are not claiming that there are
only two possible knives that could be made from the handle and blades.
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2.3 Infinitely many possible knives
In Hilbert’s knife factory there is a spare handle and infinitely many spare
blades. No knife will ever be made using any of these materials. Nevertheless,
we might naturally say that there are infinitely many possible knives that could
be made by joining the handle with one of the blades.14
This claim is no less in need of paraphrase than the claim that there are two
possible knives that could be made by joining the handle with one of the blades.
Yet unlike the latter claim, this claim cannot be paraphrased in a standard first-
order modal language. This is an instance of a more general limitative result:
In standard first-order modal logic enriched with all generalized quantifiers, our
paraphrase challenge can be met for only those generalized quantifiers that can
be defined in standard first-order logic.15 Since ‘there are infinitely many . . . ’
cannot be defined in standard first-order logic, it follows that not all modalized
claims of the form ‘there are infinitely many possible . . . ’ can be expressed in a
standard first-order modal language, no matter which (unmodalized) generalized
quantifiers the language includes. If we hope to paraphrase such claims, we must
move to a language whose expressive resources go beyond those of standard first-
order modal logic.
Luckily, there are languages in which we can paraphrase such claims. If we
enrich our first-order modal language with a device for forming infinite con-
junctions, we can then paraphrase claims of the form ‘there are infinitely many
possible . . . ’ as infinite conjunctions of the corresponding claims of the form
‘there are n possible . . . ’, for all natural numbers n. We see nothing illegitimate
about paraphrase strategies that employ conjunctions of arbitrary sets of for-
mulas, or that employ infinitary analogues of standard existential and universal
quantifiers capable of binding arbitrary sets of variables.16 The important ques-
tion is whether such strategies are su ciently general to answer our paraphrase
challenge.
2.4 Uncountably many possible knives
In Cantor’s knife factory there is a spare handle and infinitely many spare blades.
No knife will ever be made using any of these materials. Nevertheless, we might
naturally say that there are uncountably many possible knives that could be
made by joining the handle with one of the blades.
This claim is no less in need of paraphrase than the claim that there are
infinitely many possible knives that could be made by joining the handle with
one of the blades. Yet unlike the latter claim, this claim cannot be paraphrased
in a standard first-order modal language in which we can form conjunctions
14For those worried about the possibility of infinitely many non-overlapping concrete ob-
jects, note that the examples below involving electrons and involving monozygotic twins illus-
trate the same point concerning infinitary incompossibility without assuming the possibility
of an infinity of spare blades.
15See Theorem 1 of Appendix A.2. The above conclusion relies on the assumption that
the model-theoretic criterion of adequate paraphrases faithfully captures the intended one, as
discussed in section 1.4.
Throughout we will be considering modal languages that include devices for ‘undoing’ or
‘scoping out of’ modal operators. Such devices are well studied and correspond to certain
uses of ‘actually’ and ‘in fact’ in philosophers’ English; for technical details, see Fine (1977a,
section 6), Hodes (1984), and Correia (2007).
16See Dickmann (1985) for discussion of such languages.
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of arbitrary sets of formulas and existential quantifications that bind arbitrary
sets of variables, and which also includes all generalized quantifiers. This is an
instance of a more general limitative result: In such a language, our paraphrase
challenge can be met for only those generalized quantifiers that are definable in
first-order logic with infinitary conjunction (but only finitary existential and uni-
versal quantification).17 Since ‘there are uncountably many . . . ’ is not definable
in first-order logic with infinitary conjunction but only finitary quantification, it
follows that not all modalized claims of the form ‘there are uncountably many
possible . . . ’ can be expressed in the aforementioned modal language. If we hope
to paraphrase such claims, we must move to a yet more expressive language.
This result might come as a surprise to those familiar with infinitary lan-
guages, since the unmodalized ‘there are uncountably many . . . ’ can be para-
phrased in standard infinitary first-order logic as ‘some x1, x2, . . . are pairwise
distinct and are each . . . ’, where ‘x1, x2, . . . ’ stands for an uncountable set of
variables and ‘pairwise distinct’ and ‘are each . . . ’ stand for the corresponding
uncountable conjunctions. The key observation is that in our language we can-
not bind all uncountably many free variables in ‘x1, x2, . . . are pairwise distinct
and are each . . . ’ without binding uncountably many of them at once with a
single existential quantifier, forcing them to have the same scope. But as we
saw in section 2.2, paraphrasing modalized existential quantification requires
all variables so-bound to have di↵erent scopes, since for any two of them there
must be a possibility operator with intermediate scope to accommodate pairwise
incompossibility.
This suggests a new paraphrase strategy. Suppose we move to a language in
which infinitary quantification is achieved not by letting existential and universal
quantifiers bind infinitely many variables at once, but instead by allowing for
strings of infinitely many existential and universal quantifiers. Perhaps in such
a language we can paraphrase claims of the form ‘there are uncountably many
possible . . . ’ as claims of the form ‘possibly, for some x1, possibly, for some
x2, etc.: x1, x2, etc. are pairwise distinct and are each possibly . . . ’. Here, ‘etc.’
indicates an uncountable sequence: in the first case for an uncountable string of
interwoven possibility operators and existential quantifiers, and in the second
case for an uncountable string of variables.18
In Appendix A.3 we give a formal syntactic characterization of quantified
modal languages allowing for such infinite embeddings, and provide a model-
theoretic semantics relative to which our paraphrase challenge can indeed be
met for ‘there are uncountably many possible . . . ’ in the above way. For the
sake of argument we will grant that languages allowing for infinitely embedded
quantifiers and modal operators are legitimate for the purpose of paraphrasing
modalized quantification.19 Again, we will focus on the question of whether such
languages are su ciently expressive to answer our paraphrase challenge.
2.5 Most possible people
Let us finally return to Dawkins’ claim that most possible people will never be
born. It turns out that it cannot be paraphrased even in the highly infinitiary
17See Theorem 2 of Appendix A.2.
18Fine (2003, section 4) makes a similar proposal.
19Williamson (2013, chapter 7) questions their legitimacy in a related context; Fine (forth-
coming) replies.
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language considered in the previous section. Again, the inability to paraphrase
this sentence follows from a more general result: In a first-order modal lan-
guage enriched with all generalized quantifiers and in which we can infinitely
nest conjunctions, disjunctions, existential and universal quantifiers, and modal
operators, our paraphrase challenge can be met for only those generalized quan-
tifiers that are definable in a non-modal first-order language in which we can
infinitely nest conjunctions, disjunctions, and existential and universal quanti-
fiers.20 Since the unmodalized ‘most . . . are . . . ’ is not definable in the latter
non-modal language, it follows that the modalized ‘most possible . . . are . . . ’
cannot be paraphrased in the former modal language.
One might hope to answer our paraphrase challenge by moving to an even
more infinitary language in which we can form conjunctions of proper classes of
formulas and have strings of quantifiers and modal operators that bind proper
classes of variables. The general idea would be to embed some enormous conjunc-
tion within a string of interleaved possibility operators and existential quantifiers
that bind as many variables as there are possible individuals.21 But we see no
consistent way of implementing this strategy. Presumably, for any formula of
any language and any variables that occur in it, there should be some formula
of some language such that those variables are all and only the variables that
occur in it. It then follows by a plural version of Cantor’s diagonal argument
that no formula contains as many variables as there are possible individuals,
since there would have to be more formulas than possible individuals, which is
inconsistent, since formulas are individuals. To be clear: the problem is not that
a certain specified formula fails to be an adequate paraphrase but rather that
it is impossible for there to be a formula satisfying the given specification.22
We conclude that the paraphrase challenge cannot be met in even highly
infinitary first-order modal languages. In retrospect, this should be somewhat
unsurprising. After all, the way we actually explicate generalized quantifiers like
‘there are uncountably many . . . ’ is not using infinite conjunction and quantifi-
cation, but through set-theoretic or higher-order resources. In the next section
we explore the possibility of using such resources to answer our paraphrase
challenge.
20See Theorem 5 of Appendix A.4. This result vindicates the skepticism about the expres-
sivity of such languages voiced in Leuenberger (2006, p. 157) and Williamson (2013, p. 354).
21Fine (1977a, section 6) advocates such a proposal.
22Fine might resist the diagonal argument by rejecting standard plural logic in favor of a
logic akin to the non-standard class theory of Fine (2005a), which allows for a universal class.
One might also deny that we should think of formulas as individuals (i.e., as sequences of
expressions), but instead treat them as well-orderings of expressions, understood in higher-
order terms. But the problem then immediately reoccurs if we think that there is contingency
in what conditions (e.g., well-orderings) there are, as we discuss in section 3. Generalized
quantifiers and their modalizations make just as much sense concerning well-orderings as they
do concerning individuals. But using the present strategy to paraphrase modalized generalized
quantification over well-orderings would require as many second-order variables as there are
well-orderings, and hence well-orderings of variables, which leads to another cardinality crash.
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3 Higher-order paraphrases
3.1 Singling out merely possible knives
Why are we so confident that there are uncountably many possible knives that
could be made from the materials in Cantor’s knife factory? Because the factory
contains uncountably many blades, each of which could, together with the han-
dle, compose a knife were the two joined, and any two of which are such that,
necessarily, any knife made with one of them could not possibly be made with
the other. In other words, we think that there are uncountably many possible
knives that could be made using those materials because we know that there
are uncountably many ways of making knives from these materials and that
each of these ways would yield a di↵erent knife. (Dawkins o↵ers an analogous
justification of his claim that most possible people are never going to be born,
noting that the possibly exemplified human genetic profiles outnumber all the
people there will ever be.)
This suggests a strategy for answering our paraphrase challenge in full gen-
erality, including for quantifiers such as ‘most’. First, we find some ways of
singling out the possible things we are interested in. In the case of the possible
knives, for example, we appeal to the conditions under which they would be con-
structed. We then quantify over these conditions, letting them go proxy for the
possible objects themselves.23 Of course, we have only worked a simple example
involving knives, and even in that case one might reject some of our underly-
ing assumptions. We need to examine more systematically the conditions under
which such strategies can be used to paraphrase modalized quantification.
3.2 Haecceities in higher-order logic
First, we need a more precise statement of what it is for a condition F to single
out a possible object x, in which case we call F a haecceity of x. Say that F is
a haecceity of x just in case, necessarily, anything is identical to x just in case
it is F . It follows, by the principle that what is possibly necessary is necessarily
necessary, that, if F is possibly a haecceity of x, then F is necessarily a haecceity
of x, even if x is a contingent being. (Note that it does not follow from the fact
that being identical to x is a haecceity of x that being identical to x is the
only haecceity of x, since we have not assumed that necessarily co-extensive
conditions are identical.) Say that F is a haecceity just in case it is possible
that there be something of which F is a haecceity. For example, the condition
of being such that, actually, you would have been a knife made from handle h
and blade b had they been joined to form a knife is a haecceity, since, had h and
b been joined to form a knife, there would have been something – that knife –
of which it was a haecceity.24
We can now present the general strategy. The idea is to replace talk of
possible F s with talk of haecceities that possibly apply to something that is F .
For example, instead of saying that there are uncountably many possible knives,
23Related strategies were independently proposed by Plantinga (1976) and Fine (1977a,
section 2).
24In the interest of accessibility, we formulate these definitions in natural language. Some
readers might find it helpful to state them formally: F being a haecceity of xmay be regimented
as ⇤8y(y = x$ Fy), for which we write H(F, x). F being a haecceity may be regimented as
⌃9xH(F, x), for which we write H(F ).
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we might say that there are uncountably many haecceities each of which is
possibly instantiated by a knife and no two of which are possibly instantiated by
the same thing. Parallel paraphrases can be given for all generalized quantifiers.
The strategy requires moving to a higher-order modal language in which we can
quantify into predicate positions; in what follows talk of conditions, properties,
and the like should be understood as shorthand for such quantification.25
This paraphrase strategy relies on the following assumption if it is to apply
generally:
Haecceitistic Plenitude: For every possible individual there is a condition which
is its haecceity.26
Yet most philosophers who have considered the issue reject this principle: they
deny that there is a haecceity of every possible object, usually invoking merely
possible elementary particles as purported counterexamples.27 The idea is that,
just as there is contingency as regards what elementary particles there are, there
is parallel contingency in which haecceities of possible elementary particles there
are: Had there not been this electron, there would have been no haecceities of
it either. On these grounds metaphysicians usually dismiss attempts to answer
the paraphrase challenge that try to use haecceities as surrogates for possible
objects.28
But such dismissals are too quick, since there are more sophisticated para-
phrase strategies that can get by with weaker assumptions. Suppose we assume
only that haecceitistic plenitude could be true, i.e.:
Haecceitistic Compossibilism: It is possible that for every possible individual
there be a haecceity of it.29
We can now paraphrase the claim that there are uncountably many possible F s
as the claim that, possibly, there are uncountably many haecceities each of which
possibly applies to an F and no two of which possibly apply to the same thing.
We can in fact prove that, if haecceitistic compossibilism is true, then there is a
general paraphrase strategy that answers our paraphrase challenge30 – at least
insofar as such questions can be adjudicated using standard model-theoretic
methods.
The modified strategy is of interest because incompossible possible objects
can have compossible haecceities. For example, our incompossible merely pos-
sible knives seem to have compossible haecceities, since we seem to be able to
25Fritz (unpublished) formalizes this paraphrase strategy. Jager (1982) also takes himself to
be formalizing something in the vicinity of Plantinga’s informal remarks about haecceities, but
his project is quite di↵erent from ours: we are o↵ering a strategy for paraphrasing modalized
first-order quantification in a higher-order language, whereas Jager takes himself to be o↵ering
a more metaphysically hygienic alternative to Kripke’s (1963) model theory for first-order
modal languages.
For more on the operative interpretation of quantification into predicate position, see Prior
(1971) and Williamson (2003).
26Writing ⇧ for the modalized universal quantifier, this can be formalized as follows:
⇧x9XH(X,x). The appeal to ⇧ can be eliminated using the paraphrase strategy described
in section 2.1; see the appendix, section A.1 for formal details.
27See, e.g., Fine (2003) and Stalnaker (2012); Plantinga (1976, 1983) is a notable exception.





single out each of them in its absence by appealing to the conditions under which
it would be manufactured. In particular, in the imagined cases of Hilbert’s and
Cantor’s knife factories, there is a handle and a blade for each of relevant pos-
sible knives. Assuming that for any handle and blade, the condition of being a
knife made from them (in the appropriate circumstances) is a haecceity, then
all of these haecceities are compossible. And while perhaps merely possible el-
ementary particles (and matter more generally) cannot be singled out in their
absence, this is not obviously a problem, since bits of matter also seem not to
be incompossible in the manner of other possible enmattered objects like pos-
sible knives and possible people. Those who think that it is contingent what
objects can be singled out might therefore reasonably hope that haecceitistic
compossibilism a↵ords a solution to our paraphrase challenge.
3.3 Incompossible haecceities
Unfortunately, such optimism would be misplaced. Anyone who rejects haec-
ceitistic plenitude should also reject haecceitistic compossibilism, both with re-
spect to the haecceities of possible enmattered objects (e.g., possible people)
and with respect to the haecceities of possible bits of matter (e.g., possible
electrons). We will consider the two cases in turn.
Consider a healthy egg and two healthy sperm neither of which will ever
fertilize it. Assume that eggs can be fertilized by at most one sperm and that
people have their biological origins essentially. It follows that the possible people
who could be born from these biological materials are incompossible. But unlike
the case of possible knives, we do not seem to be able to single out the possible
people who could be born from these biological materials. This is because, for
each sperm, there is more than one possible person who could have had it and
the egg as its biological origins, since such biological origins could have produced
monozygotic twins. We seem to have no way of singling out any such merely
possible person from its merely possible twins. E.g., we can’t single out one of
them as the possibly first-born, since any of them might have been born before
any other. We would be able to single out the individual possible twins were they
born, but then we wouldn’t be able to single out the merely possible people who
could be born from the egg and the unused sperm. So we have a counterexample
to haecceitistic compossibilism.
The case of matter is somewhat di↵erent since bits of matter might not be
pairwise incompossible. E.g., it might be that for any two possible electrons, it
is possible for there to be both of them. Nevertheless, it seems impossible that
there be every possible elementary particle, since, whatever elementary particles
there ever are, it is possible that there be an elementary particle that is not one
of them. Assuming that necessarily there are no haecceities of merely possible
elementary particles, and that elementary particles are essentially elementary
particles, it follows that the possible haecceities of possible elementary particles
are incompossible.
Since the purported counterexamples to haecceitistic plenitude are, if gen-
uine, also counterexamples to mere haecceitistic compossibilism, the two claims
stand or fall together.
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3.4 The challenge of incompossible haecceities
If these arguments against haecceitistic compossibilism are sound, then a new
strategy is needed to meet the paraphrase challenge. Unfortunately, there are
strong model-theoretic indications that there is no available paraphrase even us-
ing the highly expressive resources of an infinitary higher-order modal language.
In particular, we can show that in a higher-order modal language enriched with
infinitary conjunction and quantification, there are pairs of models that agree
on all formulas of the language but disagree on whether there are uncountably
many objects in the extension of the open formula ‘x is a possible being’.31
Of course, this result is only as instructive as the background model theory is
well motivated. And developing variable-domain model theories for higher-order
modal languages is a non-trivial technical project with a number of important
choice points. Here we can only report that – apart from one exception, to be
discussed in section 3.6 – our models are neutral with respect to these choice
points and are in keeping with the best motivated and developed extant theories
of contingency in what objects can be singled out.32
Here is an intuitive characterization of the models. In one model the domain
of all possible individuals is countable while in the other model the domain of
all possible individuals is uncountable. In both models every finite subset of
possible individuals is the domain of some world, all worlds have finite domains,
and no two worlds have the same domain; the actual worlds of both models
have the same domain. We generate higher-order domains from the first-order
domains in accordance with the idea that the distinctions that there are at a
world are exactly those that can be drawn using the materials that there are
at that world. These two models clearly di↵er as regards whether they ought
to validate ‘there are uncountably many possible beings’ on the reading we
have been trying to paraphrase. But we can prove that the two models validate
exactly the same formulas of our infinitary higher-order modal language. In this
formal sense, there is no paraphrase of the modalized ‘there are uncountably
many possible . . . ’ in this language.
We might interpret these models as follows. Suppose that any finite number
of people could be born from a particular sperm and egg, that any finite collec-
tion of n possible people who could be born from the sperm and egg could be
born together as monozygotic n-tuplets, and that it is impossible that infinitely
many people be born from the sperm and egg. Perhaps this isn’t the most plau-
sible view about what sperms and eggs can do, but it is clearly a view we ought
to be able to make sense of. We should also be able to distinguish, on the one
hand, the conjunction of this view with the claim that there are only countably
many possible people who could be born from the sperm and egg, and, on the
other hand, the conjunction of this view with the claim that there are uncount-
ably many possible people who could be born from the sperm and egg. The two
hypotheses are naturally modeled by the pair of models described above. The
31This result is the main theorem of Fritz (unpublished); it can be seen as a generalization
of the results of Leuenberger (2006), Williamson (2010) and Fritz (2013) to a higher-order
setting. It would be prohibitively di cult to generalize this limitative result to a higher-order
language that allows for infinite embeddings, but the considerations of section 2.5 give us
every reason to expect that the modalization of ‘most’ resists paraphrase in such a language.
32We develop various model theories for infinitary higher-order modal languages in Fritz
and Goodman (forthcoming), drawing on the work of Stalnaker (2012), Williamson (2013,
chapter 6), and, especially, Fine (1977b).
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inability of our higher-order modal language to distinguish the models indicates
that it cannot distinguish these two hypotheses, on the assumption that contin-
gency in which individuals there are gives rise to corresponding contingency in
which haecceities there are.
3.5 Implications of haecceitistic plenitude
Assume for the moment that the higher-order paraphrase strategy outlined
in section 3.2 succeeds. Then haecceitistic compossibilism must be true (sec-
tion 3.4), in which case so too must haecceitistic plenitude (section 3.3). And
presumably haecceitistic plenitude is necessary if true. Hence the haecceitistic
paraphrase strategy is successful only if the following principle is true:
Weak Haecceitistic Necessitism: Necessarily everything necessarily has a haec-
ceity.33
Together with the controversial assumption that necessarily co-extensive prop-
erties are identical, weak haecceitistic necessitism entails the following principle:
Strong Haecceitistic Necessitism: It is necessary what haecceities there are.34
But what about those who deny that all necessarily co-extensive properties
are identical? Might they resist the move from weak to strong haecceitistic
necessitism?
Few have wanted to occupy such a position. For among those who deny that
necessarily co-extensive conditions are identical, those who have also wanted
to resist strong haecceitistic necessitism have usually been motivated by the
thought that (i) necessarily equivalent conditions can be distinct by being about
di↵erent individuals, (ii) which individuals a condition is about is essential to
it, and (iii) for all x, necessarily, no F is about x unless something is identical
to x. For example, the condition of being identical to you and the condition of
possibly being your biological father are respectively haecceities of you and of
your biological father that are about you, and therefore have contingent being
on account of your continent being.
By itself this combination of commitments is perfectly consistent with weak
haecceitistic necessitism, since it is consistent with the claim that, necessarily,
every individual has a qualitative haecceity with necessary being.35 But this
claim is widely rejected, since it is equivalent to an implausibly strong version
of the identity of indiscernibles, according to which, necessarily, every object
has a qualitative property that is necessarily co-extensive with being identical to
it.36 Ordinary material objects, for example, seem to lack qualitative haecceities.
Without qualitative haecceities, weak haecceitistic necessitism entails (given the
aforementioned assumptions) that, for every material object x, necessarily, there
33⇤8x⇤9XH(X,x)
34⇤8X(H(X) ! ⇤9Y X = Y ). Note that the identity connective flanked by variables in
predicate position can be eliminated in terms of a statement of higher-order indiscernibility;
i.e., instead of X = Y , we might write: 8Z(ZX $ ZY ).
Strong haecceitistic necessitism entails weak haecceitistic necessitism given the assumption
that necessarily everything has a haecceity, which should be uncontroversial given the operative
abundant understanding of conditions; see Williamson (2013, chapter 6).
35Taking the notion of a condition being about an individual as primitive, we can define a
condition to be qualitative just in case it is not possibly about any individual.
36See McMichael (1983) for discussion.
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are some individuals that single out x, where some individuals single out x just
in case there is a haecceity of x which is about all and only them. And this
claim is also thought to be wildly implausible, presumably on the grounds that,
e.g., had spacetime been empty but for a lone elementary particle, there would
not have been any individuals that singled you out.37
So it seems that the package of commitments that normally motivates hyper-
intensional contingentist higher-order metaphysics, and thereby opens up logical
space for accepting weak but not strong haecceitistic necessitism, supports an
independent argument against weak haecceitistic necessitism, rendering such a
split decision ultimately unsustainable. (Furthermore, given that haecceities are
generally considered the best candidates for contingent higher-order beings, it
would be ad hoc having accepted strong haecceitistic necessitism to not accept
necessary being at higher-orders across the board.)
But this argument is too quick. There are certain combinations of meta-
physical views which motivate endorsing weak but rejecting strong haecceitistic
necessitism. One such view arises from mereological considerations. Say that two
material objects coincide just in case they share parts with exactly the same
things. It is widely believed that distinct material objects can coincide – for
example, a statue and the clay that composes it. According to one widely dis-
cussed version of this view, coincidence is ubiquitous in the following sense: for
any function from possibilities to possible objects that would have been material
objects had the relevant possibility been realized, there is a possible material
object whose modal profile of mereological coincidence is given by that func-
tion.38 It follows that, in any possible one-particle universe, there is an object
coincident with the particle in that situation, coincident with you in all possible
situations in which you exist, and in all other possible situations fails to be a
material object. We might then conjecture that, in a one-particle universe, you
could be singled out in terms of your possible mereological relations to such ob-
jects. With certain additional assumption, this can be turned into a argument
for weak haecceitistic necessitism.39 Thus, combining a plenitudinous modal
mereology with a hyper-intensional metaphysics of properties would allow one
to accept weak haecceitistic compossibilism while rejecting strong haecceitistic
compossibilism.
Where would such a split decision leave the haecceitistic paraphrase strat-
egy? The model-theoretic results mentioned give us strong reasons to think that
the propositions conveyed by sentences in need of paraphrase and the proposi-
tions expressed by their paraphrases would be necessarily equivalent. But given
that the envisaged position denies that necessarily co-extensive properties are
thereby identical, this gives us little reason to think that the relevant propo-
sitions are identical. Defenders of positions like these would need a conception
of the granularity of properties and propositions which is fine enough to accept
weak haecceitistic necessitism but reject strong haecceitistic necessitism while
also being coarse enough to allow for the haecceitistic paraphrase strategy to
37Fine (1985, p. 190) gives an inchoate version of this argument, writing that ‘even though
a property [of being identical to some merely possible individual] has no [. . . ] counterpart [. . . ]
involving actual individuals alone, there may, in each world, exist individuals that su ce to
specify its application conditions. This, though, would be a kind of modal freak.’
38A closely related thesis is defended by Hawthorne (2006) under the heading of ‘plenitude’
and is formally explored by Hovda (2013) and Goodman (unpublished).
39See Hovda (2013).
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succeed. We are skeptical that there is any plausible way of threading this needle.
We thus conclude that strong haecceitistic necessitism is a requirement for the
success of the haecceitistic paraphrase strategy. Since haecceities are the best
candidates for properties with contingent being, we can strengthen this con-
clusion: the haecceitistic paraphrase strategy succeeds only if it is a necessary
matter what properties there are.
3.6 Paraphrase without compossible haecceities
As we alluded to earlier, the formal results cited in section 3.4 have a caveat.
We will first explain the caveat, and then explain how it suggests a di↵erent
(non-haecceitistsic) way of using higher-order resources to paraphrase modal-
ized quantification. Although this new strategy requires a combination of com-
mitments that, to our knowledge, no actual philosopher holds, it is neverthless
of great interest because, unlike the haecceitistic paraphrase strategy, its success
does not require that it be necessary what properties there are.
When developing variable-domain model theories for first-order modal lan-
guages, one faces a choice concerning what intensions (functions from worlds to
extensions) are admissible values of monadic predicates. In a negative semantics,
the intensions must map every world to a subset of the domain of that world.
In a positive semantics, intensions can map worlds to any subset of the ‘outer
domain’ of the model (i.e., the union of all domains of all worlds in the model).
This distinction between negative and positive semantics carries over straight-
forwardly to variable-domain model theories for higher-order modal languages,
and the theorem mentioned earlier is robust with respect to this decision point.
But a third choice is possible in a higher-order setting. This is because, rela-
tive to an assignment of values in the outer domain of a model to free variables in
a formula, that formula might express a proposition – i.e., determine a function
from worlds to truth values – that is impossible, in the sense of not being in the
propositional domain of any world in the model. For example, the intersection
(i.e., conjunction) of two incompossible propositions in the domains of di↵erent
worlds might not be in the domain of any world. But we can still, in a sense,
talk about such propositions using modalized existential quantification over their
conjuncts (which we can paraphrase in the way described in section 2.1). This
then raises the question: should we allow variables in sentential-operator position
to have such impossible propositions in their extensions? An a rmative answer
is suggested by a higher-order analogue of a thought that is usually used to
motivate first-order positive semantics – namely, the thought that there is such
a property as self-identity and even contingent non-beings are self-identical. A
higher-order analogue of this thought is that there is such a property of proposi-
tions as not being the case and (on pain of failing to validate the modal closure
of a theorem of propositional logic) for any two possible propositions, either
their conjunction is not the case or the conjunction of their negations is not the
case.40 Model theoretically, this will require allowing variables to have values
intensionally equivalent to negation, in which case their extensions will have to
40An odd feature of higher-order negative semantics, as developed in Fritz and Goodman
(forthcoming) based on ideas of Stalnaker (2012), is that it validates a non-classical theory
of first-order identity and the claim that there is such a property as self-identity, but in the
higher-order case keeps a classical theory of negation and hence invalidates the claim that
there is any such property of propositions as negation.
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be defined on the aforementioned impossible conjunctions.
On the natural way of developing this kind of ‘super-positive’ semantics, it
will be easy to cook up a translation schema that has the e↵ect of making the
bound variables of any type ‘range over’ the ‘super-outer’ domain of the model
– i.e., over all intensions definable in the model irrespective of whether they
(or any lower-order intensions to which they apply at any world) are in the
domain of any world of the model. Roughly, ‘super-outer-all properties are '’ is
translated as the claim that the property of properties being actually such that '
is identical to the property of properties being actually co-extensive with oneself.
What goes for properties goes for relations, and this is what allows us to solve the
problem of incompossible haecceitites: for example, by simulating quantification
over impossible relations among incompossible individuals in terms of which we
can assess those individals’ cardinality. In fact, it can be shown that, relative
to a natural class of super-positive higher-order structures, we can paraphrase
all modalized quantifiers (in the same sense as the theorem concerning positive
and negative semantics assuming haecceitistic compossibilism). Note that, in
addition to requiring a super-positive semantics for higher-order predication,
the strategy also requires a positive semantics for first-order predication: for
example, it requires that I would have had properties (such as self-identity)
even had there been no such thing as me.41
Notice, however, that the paraphrase strategy depends on higher-order iden-
tities – e.g., between the two properties in italics above – that will not generally
be accepted by those with hyperintensional theories of properties. This is in
contrast with the haecceitistic paraphrase strategy, which did not assume an
intensional theory of property granularity. Although the intensional models of
course validate that level of granularity, in this respect they can be treated
instrumentally as modeling an intensional shadow of a potentially hyperinten-
sional hierarchy, in a sense that can be made formally precise.42 But the same
cannot be said of the ‘super-positive’ paraphrase strategy, since in that setting
higher-order identity cannot be treated as shorthand for some kind of modally
definable equivalence relation – the strategy requires taking identity as primi-
tive, in the sense that it is not definable in the identity-free fragment relative
to the super-positive semantics.
We therefore conclude that a successful higher-order paraphrase strategy is
available without the assumption of the necessity of what properties there are,
but only on the assumption of two contentious principle: first, that properties
can apply to propositions and properties which there could not even possibly
be, and second, that necessarily equivalent propositions and properties are iden-
tical.43
41The technical details would take us too far afield and will have to wait for another occasion.
42See the discussion of ‘hereditary intensionality’ in Fritz and Goodman (forthcoming).
43One worry for this paraphrase strategy is that it is not clear that an intensional theory of
higher-order granularity is compatible the aboutness-theoretic ideas which are usually used to
motivate contingency in what properties there are; see Fine (1977b, p. 179-82). In future work
we plan to test the robustness of this paraphrase strategy by considering how it generalizes
to certain natural hyperintensional but fairly coarse-grained aboutness-theoretic models of
higher-order contingency; we are not optimistic about its prospects.
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4 Other expressive resources
We have seen that there are general strategies for answering our paraphrase
challenge using higher-order resources, but that they rely on highly controversial
assumptions. Those who wish to reject those assumptions must therefore find
other expressive resources with which to answer the challenge, beyond those
available in infinitary higher-order modal logic. In this section we argue that it
is unlikely that any strategy along these lines can be made to work.
One style of paraphrase that goes beyond the expressive resources of higher-
order modal logic is fictionalism. The idea would be to paraphrase the claim
that there are uncountably many possible knives that could be made from ma-
terials in Cantor’s knife factory by saying that, according to a certain fiction,
there are uncountably many individuals satisfying a corresponding condition. A
full account must of course spell out what the fiction is, what the corresponding
condition is, and how the strategy generalizes to cover all modalized uses of gen-
eralized quantifiers. A closely related idea is to exploit counterfactuals rather
than the notion of truth in fiction: for example, by paraphrasing the aforemen-
tioned sentence with the counterfactual claim that, had a certain claim been
true (say, had it been necessary what individuals there are), then there would
have been uncountably many individuals satisfying a corresponding condition
(say, being possibly knives made from the relevant materials).44
The most promising versions of these proposals are all instances of a more
general paraphrase strategy, appealing to some notion of possibility distinct from
metaphysical possibility (fictional possibility, counterfactual possibility, etc.) ac-
cording to which it is possible for there to be all actually metaphysically possible
individuals. We first present this abstract strategy, and then ask what is required
of a notion of possibility to serve in this strategy, considering in particular such
notions formulated in terms of fictions and counterfactuals. We then argue that
even if there is such a notion of possibility and the general strategy can be car-
ried out, this modality gives rise to its own paraphrase challenge, which cannot
be solved in the same way.
4.1 The hyper-possibility paraphrase
We saw in section 2.2 that incompossibility is the barrier to paraphrasing modal-
ized quantifiers in terms of ordinary quantifiers and modal operators. If we could
only somehow bring together all possible individuals in a way that would let us
talk about the actual distribution of properties and relations among them, that
would be enough. In other words, we could answer the paraphrase challenge if
only there were some notion of possibility – call it hyper-possibility – such that it
is hyper-possible that there be all actually metaphysically possible individuals,
and such that we can use actuality operators to ‘scope out’ of hyper-possibility
operators and thereby, within the scope of the hyper-possible, draw distinctions
44See Fine (2003, section 5) for a discussion of fictionalist paraphrases, and Fine (forth-
coming) for an endorsement and formal development of a variant using an ‘according to the
supposition’ operator; important precursors include Rosen (1990) and Sider (2002). The coun-
terfactual approach is inspired by Dorr (2005, section 3) and Dorr (2008, section 2); see also
Woodward (2012). Note that fictionalist paraphrase of modalized quantification should not
be confused with fictionalism as a theory about the metaphysics of ‘possible worlds’, defended
by Rosen (1990).
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among all actually metaphysically possible things with respect to their actual
properties and relations.
Let us illustrate how to carry out this strategy in more detail using the ex-
ample of Dawkins’ claim that most possible people are never born. This requires
scope-indicating devices of the sort mentioned in footnote 15. These are, first,
the familiar philosophers’ ‘actually’ operator, and second, a less familiar family
of ‘in facti’ operators that have the e↵ect of letting the subformula they embed
be evaluated at a wider scope indicated by a co-indexed "i. Given these devices,
the claim that it is hyper-possible that there be all actually metaphysically
possible individuals can be formulated more perspicuously as follows:
It is hyper-possible that "1 actually metaphysically necessarily ev-
erything is in fact1 identical to something.
This statement now needs to be continued to say that, in some such ‘hyper-
possibility’, most actually metaphysically possible people are actually never
born.
It is hyper-possible that: "1 actually metaphysically necessarily ev-
erything is in fact1 identical to something, and most things such that
actually, it is metaphysically possible that they are people are such
that, actually, they are never born.45
4.2 Conditions for success
We know that any notion of hyper-possibility for which the above paraphrase
strategy succeeds must be a weaker notion of possibility than the notion of
‘metaphysical’ possibility we have been operating with thus far. But hyper-
possibility must also be su ciently metaphysically robust to permit quantifying
in and ‘scoping out’. The question is whether any notion of possibility meets
these two requirements. The answer to this question is not at all clear.
Suppose, for example, that we can make sense of a notion of ‘logical possibil-
ity’ such that, for any formula ' of a first-order modal language, pit is logically
possible that 'q is true just in case ' is satisfiable relative to a standard pos-
sible world semantics for first-order modal logic. Note first that Leibniz’s law
fails to hold within the scope of logical possibility, since it is logically possible
that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus but not logically possible that Hes-
perus is distinct from Hesperus. Given such opacity, one might worry whether
one can unambiguously quantify into the scope of this operator. Second, and
more importantly, we cannot use an actuality operator to scope out of ‘it is log-
ically possible that . . . ’, since, although there are no flying pigs, it is logically
possible that there are actually flying pigs. So this notion of logical possibility
is not metaphysically robust, and is therefore not suitable to play the role of
hyper-possibility.
Further candidates for hyper-possibility can be obtained using the fictionalist
and counterfactual resources mentioned above. Hyper-possibility may therefore
45In a first-order modal language including a hyper-possibility operator hhi, an actually
operator @, the operator "i, an operator #i formalizing ‘in facti’, as well as the generalized
quantifierM formalizing ‘most’, this can be written as follows:
hhi("1 @⇤8x #1 9y(x = y) ^Mxy(@⌃Px,@¬By))
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be thought of as expressed by the phrase ‘according to the fiction that there are
all actually possible things . . . ’ or the phrase ‘had it been the case that there are
all actually possible things, it would have been the case that . . . ’. It is far from
clear that these clauses interact as required with quantifiers and scope indicating
devices such as actuality operators. But it turns out that we can sidestep that
question for present purposes, as the proposed paraphrase strategies su↵er from
additional problems.
4.3 Revenge
The first problem is that it is unclear whether any metaphysically robust no-
tion of hyper-possibility is weak enough to admit the possibility of there being
all actually metaphysically possible individuals. Even if some such modality
can be used to evade essentialism-induced incompossibility, there is no reason
to think it will evade the second sort of incompossibility discussed in section
2.3 – namely, the incompossibility that results from the fact that, necessarily,
whatever possible elementary particles there are, it is possible that there be
all of them and one more possible elementary particle. The same considera-
tions that lead us to think that all metaphysically possible elementary particles
are metaphysically incompossible should lead us to think that all metaphysically
possible elementary particles are hyper -incompossible – namely, that it is hyper -
necessary that, whatever actually metaphysically possible elementary particles
there are, it is hyper -possible that there be all of them and one more actually
metaphysically possible elementary particle. Compare: it is metaphysically nec-
essary that whatever actually nomologically possible elementary particles there
are, it is metaphysically possible that there be all of them and one more actually
nomologically possible elementary particle.
We therefore see no reason to think that there is any metaphysically robust
notion of hyper-possibility according to which it is hyper-possible that there
be all actually metaphysically possible elementary particles. And even if there
were such a notion, it would not allow us to answer the paraphrase challenge in
full generality, because we could still run a di↵erent analogue of the argument
from section 2.3. Presumably it is hyper-necessary that, whatever hyper-possible
elementary particles there are, it is hyper-possible that there be all of them and
one more. It follows that the hyper-possible elementary particles are hyper-
incompossible. This raises such questions as: Are most hyper-possible elemen-
tary particles metaphysically possible? The proponent of the hyper-possibility
paraphrase now faces an paraphrase challenge exactly analogous to the one with
which we began. It is no help to appeal to an infinite hierarchy of notions of
hyper-possibility, since the disjunction of all such modalities will itself be a
notion of hyper-possibility to which the revenge argument applies.
5 Conclusion
We have raised a paraphrase challenge for anyone who denies that
(1) It is necessary what individuals there are.
After having surveyed the most promising strategies for answering it, we con-
clude that only two, both appealing to higher-order resources, have a chance of
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success. And even here, their successes respectively require the following highly
contentious assumptions:
(2) It is necessary what properties there are.
(3) Necessarily co-extensive properties are identical, properties of individuals
can apply to merely possible individuals, and properties of properties can
apply to properties which there could even not possibly be.
We conclude that at least one of (1), (2) or (3) is true.46
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A Appendix: Definability of modalized general-
ized quantifiers in infinitary first-order modal
logics
In this appendix, we prove and discuss the results on the definability of modal-
izations of generalized quantifiers appealed to in section 2. In the interest of
brevity and readability, we will keep the definitions somewhat informal, and
only sketch proofs of the results.47
47The appendix is the work of the first author.
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A.1 Well-founded languages
We start with the more standard languages appealed to in sections 2.3 and
2.4, which require the subformula relation to be well-founded. For simplicity,
we assume that we are working in a relational signature, so we don’t allow
individual constants or function symbols. As usual, we let L!! be the language
of first-order logic, i.e., the set of formulas built out of atomic predications
(including identity statements, = being treated as a logical connective) using
negation (¬), binary disjunction and conjunction (_ and ^), and existential and
universal quantification (9 and 8). Likewise, we use L1! for the extension of
this language obtained by allowing the disjunction and conjunction operators





and L11 for the further extension obtained by also allowing existential and
universal quantification binding sets of variables of arbitrary cardinality. These
languages are interpreted as usual over a model A given by a set |A| (the domain
of quantification) and a relation RA of the appropriate arity on |A| for each
relational symbol R in our signature. We write A, a ✏ ' for ' being true in A
relative to an assignment function a; note that a may be partial, as long as it
is defined on all free variables in '.
From L!! and L11, we derive first-order modal languages Lmq!! and Lmq11 by
adding four resources: (i) all generalized quantifiers; (ii) a new kind of variables,
called world-variables, which can be used as atomic formulas; (iii) existential
and universal quantifiers binding a single world variable; and (iv) an additional
operator @ operating on a world variable and a formula. We will mark the dif-
ference between the two kinds of variables by using Roman letters for individual
variables and Greek letters for world variables.
We interpret the modal languages over the usual Kripke models, understood
as tuples hW,D, i, wi, where W is a set (the ‘set of worlds’), D is a function
mapping each v 2W to a setDv (the ‘domain of w’), and i is a function mapping
each relation symbol of our signature to a function which maps every world v
to a relation of the appropriate arity on Dv. We evaluate formulas relative to a
world v and an assignment function a, writingM, v, a ✏ ' for ' being true inM
and v relative to a. Assignment functions may again be partial, and in addition
to mapping individual variables to individuals, now also map world variables to
worlds. We letDv be the domain of individual quantifiers – including generalized
quantifiers – evaluated at v. A world variable is true in just the world assigned
to it; world quantifiers range over the set of worlds; and the e↵ect of @⇠ is to
let the world of evaluation be the world assigned to ⇠.
More precise definitions of such modal languages can be found in Williamson
(2013, section 7.9) and Fritz (2013), although both use a kind of generalized
actuality operators instead of explicit quantification over worlds. We choose ex-
plicit quantification over worlds here since this generalizes more naturally to
the case of non-well-founded languages; see Appendix A.5 for further discus-
sion of this di↵erence. For now, we only note that it is straightforward to use
the resources available here to define the familiar operators for possibility and




For more on quantifiers binding world variables, see the literature on hybrid
logic, e.g., Areces and ten Cate (2007). See Westerst˚ahl (2011) for a definition
of generalized quantifiers and their interpretation, and Fritz (2013, section 1)
for generalized quantifiers in modal logic.
We say that a generalized quantifier Q is definable in a given language just in
case adding it to the language does not increase its expressivity, in the sense that
every sentence of the expanded language is equivalent to some sentence in the
original language (where two sentences are equivalent just in case they are true in
the same models and false in the same models – the non-well-founded languages
discussed below introduce gaps in the truth-value assignment, so agreement on
truth and falsity have to be imposed separately). A helpful reformulation of
this notion uses what we might call the canonical sentence  Q of a generalized
quantifier Q, which is simply the result of applying it to a sequence of atomic
formulas using relation symbols of appropriate arities, keeping all variables and
relation symbols distinct. We can show that in any non-modal language consid-
ered here (including the non-well-founded languages to be introduced below),
Q is definable if and only if the language contains a sentence equivalent to  Q.
For any generalized quantifier Q, define the modalization of Q to be an
operator QO which when added to any modal language considered here has the
following truth-conditions:









Here, M = hW,D, i, wi and '(x¯)M,v,aO =
 
o¯ 2  Su2W Du n :M, v, a[o¯/x¯] ✏ ' .
(In general, we indicate a sequence of elements by putting a bar over the relevant
term, leaving the length of the sequence to be determined by the context. We also
adopt the usual convention of writing a[o/x] for the x-variant of the assignment
a which maps x to o, and extend this to the case of tuples in the obvious way.)
Definability of modalized generalized quantifiers is understood as before, except
that we take two sentences to be equivalent if they are true/false in the same
Kripke models in the same worlds. We also extend the definition of the canonical
sentence of a modalized generalized quantifier in the obvious way, but note that
in the Kripke models used here, the extension of a relation at a world is confined
to the individuals at that world, so it is no longer clear that being able to express
the canonical sentence of a modalized generalized quantifier implies being able
to define it, although of course the converse still holds.
A.2 Definability in well-founded languages
Theorem 1. The modalization of a generalized quantifier Q is definable in Lmq!!
if and only if Q is definable in L!!.
Proof. It is straightforward to adapt the proof of Fritz (2013, p. 656, Theorem 1)
to the present setting.
Theorem 2. The modalization of a generalized quantifier Q is definable in
Lmq11 if and only if Q is definable in L1!.
Proof. If Q is definable in L1! then there is a sentence ' of L1! equivalent to
 Q. Define 'O to be the result of replacing quantifiers by complex constructions
in ', replacing
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9x by 9⇠(⇠ ^ ⌃9x@⇠ ), and
8x by 9⇠(⇠ ^⇤8x@⇠ ).
For any   in Lmq11 enriched by QO, replacing every occurrence of QO by 'O (in
which atomic predications are in turn replaced by the relevant subformulas of
 ) results in a sentence of Lmq11 which we can prove to be equivalent to  .
For the other direction, we adapt the proof of Fritz (2013, p. 664, Proposi-
tion 10). Let Q be a generalized quantifier not definable in L1!. Consider any
infinite ordinal ↵ and let L↵1! be the class of L1! sentences of quantifier rank
up to ↵. As noted in Va¨a¨na¨nen (2004, p. 46, Lemma 9), L↵1! has at most i↵
sentences up to equivalence, so the class of models defined by  Q is not the
union of equivalence classes of the relation of satisfying the same sentences of
L↵1!. Hence there are models A andB which satisfy the same sentences of L↵1!,
while A but not B satisfies  Q. By Karp (1965, p. 410, Theorem 1), there is a
back-and-forth system of length ↵ relating A and B. As in Fritz (2013, p. 664,
Lemma 9), we can extend this to a kind of back-and-forth system which holds
between Kripke models An and Bn based on A and B, and conclude from this
that An and Bn satisfy the same sentences of Lmq11 up to modal depth ↵ (which
can now be understood as world quantifier depth). From the fact that A but
not B satisfies  Q, we can conclude that An but not Bn satisfies  QO . Since
every sentence of Lmq11 has some ordinal modal depth, we conclude that no such
sentence defines QO.
A.3 Non-well-founded languages
We now turn to the languages appealed to in section 2.5, which allow for in-
finitely deep nestings of operators. The literature on such languages goes back
to Hintikka and Rantala (1976), whose approach we follow here. According to
it, formulas are given by labeled trees – allowing infinite branching as well as
infinitely long branches – in which leaf nodes are labeled by atomic formulas
and non-leaf nodes are labeled by operators. Here, we will define these languages
in a somewhat unorthodox way, in a sense combining the traditional recursive
definition of formulas with Hintikka and Rantala’s tree-based approach. We mo-
tivate setting up the languages in this way at the end of this section; now, we
start by defining the syntax and semantics.
Define a tree to be a partial order hT,i such that for all t, t0 2 T :
(a) {s : s  t} is well-ordered by ,
(b) there is a leaf (maximal element) s such that t  s, and
(c) if {s : s  t} = {s : s  t0} and the order type of this set is a limit ordinal,
t = t0.
With this, we define the formulas of N11 using the standard method of (fini-
tary) structural recursion, but with the following (partly non-standard) clauses:
• For any relation symbol R and variables x¯, Rx¯ is a formula.
• If ' is a formula, then ¬' is a formula.
• hT,, gi is a formula, given that
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– hT,i is a tree (as defined above),
– g is a function on T mapping any leaf to a formula and any non-leaf
to _, ^, 9x or 8x (for some individual variable x), and
– if t is not a leaf and g(t) /2 {^,_}, then t has a unique successor.
To interpret formulas of N11, we adapt Hintikka and Rantala’s game-
theoretic semantics. Since we have a hybrid syntax, we also proceed with a
hybrid semantics, using games only for the step of trees in the usual recursion
of truth-conditions relative to a model and an assignment function. As before,
we allow assignment functions to be partial, and in this case, don’t even require
them to be defined on all free variables. As infinite embeddings may introduce
truth-value gaps, we define separate properties of truth and falsity, noting that
the semantics will never assign both truth and falsity, but sometimes neither.
An atomic formula Rx¯ is undefined if a is undefined on some variable in x¯,
in all other cases, truth and falsity are defined in the usual bivalent manner.
¬' is true/false if ' is false/true. For a formula based on a tree, we construct a
game between two players, V (‘verifier’) and F (‘falsifier’), defining the formula
to be true if and only if V has a winning strategy and false if and only if F has
a winning strategy. We define this game as follows:
Let ' = hT,, gi be a formula of N11, A a model and a an assignment
function '. Plays of the game determined by these three items consist of a
(possibly transfinite) sequence of stages. Each such stage is given by a node of
the tree (i.e., an element of T ) and an assignment function. V wins the game
if the node of the last stage is labeled by a formula which is true in A and the
assignment function of the last stage; F wins the game if this formula is false
relative to these parameters; the game is a draw otherwise. Note that the game
can be a draw because the formula labeling the node of the last stage is neither
true nor false relative to the relevant parameters, or because there is no last
stage. We define the plays of the game determined by ', A and a by transfinite
induction (where the play concludes once the node of the current stage is a leaf
of the tree):
• Stage 0 is given by the root node of ' and a.
• If stage ↵ is given by node t and assignment b, then:
– If t is labeled by _, then V chooses one of its successors t0; stage n+1
is given by t0 and b.
– If t is labeled by ^, then F chooses one of its successors t0; stage n+1
is given by t0 and b.
– If t is labeled by 9x, then V chooses an element o of the domain of
A; stage n+ 1 is given by the successor of t and b[o/x].
– If t is labeled by 8x, then F chooses an element o of the domain of
A; stage n+ 1 is given by the successor of t and b[o/x].
• Stage  , for limit ordinal  , is the limit of the stages <  , defined as
follows: Let ht↵ : ↵ <  i and hb↵ : ↵ <  i be the sequences of nodes and
assignment functions of the stages <  . Then we define the node of the
limit stage to be the first node after the elements of ht↵ : ↵ <  i (this is
guaranteed to be unique by constraint (c) of the definition of trees above).
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We define the assignment of the limit stage to map every variable x to the
element o such that for some ↵ <  , b (x) = o for all   <   such that
↵ <  , and to be undefined on x of there is no such element.
This concludes the definition ofN11. As noted in Rantala (1979, p. 122), we can
turn every sentence of L11 into an equivalent sentence of N11 by replacing
every quantification over a set of variables of size  by an infinite sequence of
existential quantifiers of length . However, there are sentences of N11 which
have no equivalent in L11; this follows from the fact that the so-called game
quantifier, which can be thought of as an ! sequence of alternating existential
and universal quantifiers, is clearly definable in N11, but as noted in Kolaitis
(1985, p. 370), it can be shown not to be definable in L11 (see Va¨a¨na¨nen (2011,
p. 244, Proposition 9.38) for a proof).
Formulas of the modal extension Nmq11 are defined as in the case of well-
founded languages by adding clauses for the resources (i) – (iv) specified above.
More precisely, we define a formula of Nmq11 using the following recursion:
• For any relation symbol R and individual variables x¯, Rx¯ is a formula.
• If ' is a formula, then ¬' is a formula.
• ⇠ is a formula, for any world variable ⇠.
• Qx¯'¯ is a formula, given that Q is a generalized quantifier, each x¯i is a
sequence of variables and 'i is a formula.
• hT,, gi is a formula, given that
– hT,i is a tree (as defined above),
– g is a function on T mapping any leaf to a formula and any non-leaf
to ¬, _, ^, 9x, 8x, 9⇠, 8⇠ or @⇠ (for some individual variable x and
world variable ⇠), and
– if t is not a leaf and g(t) /2 {^,_}, then t has a unique successor.
We define truth and falsity of a formula ' of Nmq11 in a Kripke model M
and a world w relative to an assignment function a. The conditions for atomic
formulas and negation are as above. A world variable ⇠ is true in w if and only
if w is assigned to it; it is false in w if and only if another world is assigned to it;
and so it is undefined if the assignment function is not defined on it. Similarly,
the truth-conditions for generalized quantifiers are standard, except that Qx¯'¯
is undefined if for some i and sequence o¯ of elements in Dw, 'i is undefined in
M, w and a[o¯/x¯i]. The definition of truth of a tree-based formula di↵ers only in
the construction of the relevant game. Given a formula ' = hT,, gi of Lmq11, a
Kripke model M, a world w of M and an assignment function a, this is defined
as follows: A stage of the game is given by an element of T , a world (which
might be undefined) and an assignment function. Plays are defined as above,
with obvious minor amendments, as well as the following new rules:
• Stage 0 is given by the root node of ', w and a.
• If stage ↵ is given by node t, world v and assignment b, then:
– If t is labeled by 9x, then V chooses an element o 2 Dv; stage n+ 1
is given by the successor of t, v and b[o/x].
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– If t is labeled by 8x, then F chooses an element o 2 Dv; stage n+ 1
is given by the successor of t, v and b[o/x].
– If t is labeled by 9⇠, then V chooses a world u; stage n + 1 is given
by the successor of t, v and b[u/⇠].
– If t is labeled by 8⇠, then F chooses a world u; stage n + 1 is given
by the successor of t, v and b[u/⇠].
– If t is labeled by @⇠, then stage n+ 1 is given by the successor of t,
b(⇠) and b.
• Stage   is given as above, except that the world of the limit stage is the
world v such that for some ↵ <  , the world of stage   is v for all   <  
such that ↵ <  , and is undefined if there is no such element.
This concludes the definition ofNmq11. As before, we note that every sentence
of Lmq11 can be turned into an equivalent sentence of Nmq11. As in the case of
well-founded languages, we use ✏ to express truth of a formula relative to the
appropriate parameters, and now use ✏similarly for falsity.
Our unusual way of setting up N11 and Nmq11 is mainly motivated by the
inclusion of all generalized quantifiers in the latter language. While a number
of generalized quantifiers can be given a natural game-theoretic semantics (see
Pietarinen (2007)), to our knowledge, there is no general game-theoretic se-
mantics for arbitrary generalized quantifiers. (Engstro¨m (2012) makes steps in
this direction, but his constructions only apply to a limited class of general-
ized quantifiers and also require us to move from a two-player game to a game
between teams of players.) We therefore have to combine a truth-conditional
semantics for generalized quantifiers with a game-theoretic semantics for infini-
tary embeddings; the above hybrid provides a natural and general way of doing
so.
Another feature of our presentation to note is the definition of limit stages
of a game, which explicitly allows for variables not to be assigned an element –
this can happen if there is an infinite sequence of quantifiers binding the same
variables and the players keep choosing di↵erent elements for it. Such cases
are usually implicitly assumed to be ruled out syntactically; Oikkonen (1979,
p. 104, (iv)) does so explicitly. Ruling out these cases syntactically is unnatural
in the setting of Nmq11 since the same problem occurs in the case of the world
of evaluation for formulas with branches containing an infinite sequence of ⌃s –
of course, the formulas we are most interested in are exactly such formulas, so
we cannot rule these out syntactically. Adapting this treatment, one could also
allow for infinite nestings of negations, but since this would make no di↵erence
to the following results, it is omitted for simplicity.
A.4 Definability in non-well-founded languages
To characterize which generalized quantifiers are modalizable in Nmq11, we adapt
a number of ideas from Williamson (2010, Appendix 3). We start with some
definitions, observations and lemmas. Define a function ·n for every natural
number n which maps every model A to the Kripke model An = hW,D, i, ;i,
where W is the set of subsets of |A| of cardinality  n, Dw = w for all w 2W ,
and i(R)(w) = RA \ wn for all relation symbols R.
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Note that for every generalized quantifier Q and n < !, there is a formula  nQ
of L!! which defines Q on models up to cardinality n; i.e., for every model A of
cardinality  n, A ✏  nQ i↵ A ✏  Q. We write  nQ('¯) for the result of replacing the
atomic formulas in  nQ by the formulas of '¯, leaving the appropriate replacements
of variables implicit. Define the relativization of a generalized quantifier Q of
type n¯ to be the generalized quantifier Qrel of type h1, n¯i such that for all sets D
and D0 ✓ D and sequence of relations R¯ on D, QrelD (D0, R¯) if and only if Q0D(R¯0),
where R¯0 is the sequence of relations in R¯ restricted toD0. See Westerst˚ahl (2011,
section 7) for a more precise definition.
For every n < !, we define a mapping [·]n from Nmq11 to N11 by a number
of replacements. For present purposes, we assume that all individual variables
of N11 are individual variables of Nmq11, and that in addition, N11 contains
distinct individual variables ⇠0, . . . , ⇠n 1 for each world variable ⇠ of Nmq11, as
well as new individual variables w0, . . . , wn 1. We replace
• Rx¯ by Rx¯ ^Vx2x¯Wi<n x = wi
• ⇠ by 8x  Wi<n x = ⇠i $ Wi<n x = wi 
• Qx¯'¯ by  nQrel
 W
i<n x = wi, '¯
 
, where x is not free in any '¯
• 9x' by 9x  Wi<n x = wi ^ ' 
• 8x' by 8x  Wi<n x = wi ! ' 
• 9⇠' by 9⇠¯'
• 8⇠' by 8⇠¯'
• @⇠' by 8w¯  Vi<n ⇠i = wi ! ' 
For any sentence sentence ' of Nmq11, we define [']n to be 8w¯'0, where '0 is
the result of carrying out the above replacements on '. Note that we write
M ✏ '/M ✏' for ' being true/false in every world of the Kripke model M.
Lemma 3. For any n < !, sentence ' of Nmq11 and model A, if all relation
symbols occurring in ' are of arity  n, then An ✏ ' i↵ A ✏ [']n, and An ✏'
i↵ A ✏[']n.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of '.
Lemma 4. Let A be a model and Q a generalized quantifier of type n¯. Then
A ✏  Q i↵ Amax(n¯) ✏  QO , and A ✏ Q i↵ Amax(n¯) ✏ QO .
Proof. By the construction of Amax(n¯).
Theorem 5. The modalization of a generalized quantifier Q is definable in
Nmq11 if and only if Q is definable in N11.
Proof. The right-to-left direction can be established as in the proof of Theo-
rem 2. For the left-to-right direction, let Q be a generalized quantifier of type n¯
whose modalization QO is definable in Nmq11. Then there is a formula ' of Nmq11
such that for all models A, Amax(n¯) ✏  QO i↵ Amax(n¯) ✏ ', and Amax(n¯) ✏ QO
i↵ Amax(n¯) ✏'. By Lemmas 3 and 4, it follows that for all models A, A ✏  Q i↵
A ✏ [']max(n¯), and A ✏ Q i↵ A ✏[']max(n¯). So Q is definable in N11.
34
A.5 Conclusions and remarks
Using Theorems 1, 2 and 5, we can use standard results on the undefinability of
generalized quantifiers in L!!, L1! and N11 to deduce the undefinability of
the corresponding modalized generalized quantifiers in Lmq!! , Lmq11 and Nmq11.
In particular, we note the following, using open English sentences to denote the
relevant generalized quantifiers:
• ‘there are infinitely many . . . ’ is not definable in L!!.
• ‘there are uncountably many . . . ’ is not definable in L1!.
• ‘most . . . are . . . ’ is not definable in N11.
The first follows from the compactness of L!!, the second from Fact 1.1.1
of Dickmann (1985, p. 318), and the last from a version of the downward
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem for N11 (Karttunen, 1983, p. 228, Theorem 2.1).
Let us also add a few remarks on the robustness of the above results: First,
we impose a negative free logic in the model theory for our modal languages,
requiring the interpretation of a relation at a world in a Kripke model to be
restricted to the domain of that world. All of the results presented above go
through as well if this assumption is dropped. Second, we used the relatively
rich resources of world quantification rather than the more modest generalized
actuality operators used in Williamson (2013, chapter 7). Since the latter are
easily definable using the former, it is clear that our choice does not weaken the
direction of our results which deduces the definability of Q from the definability
of QO in the relevant languages. And in the mapping which establishes the
reverse direction, we could have used the operators Williamson uses, so all of
the results presented here are independent of this choice.
Finally, note that the preceding results are established using two distinct
proof strategies; the proofs for well-founded languages employ the use of back-
and-forth systems as in Fritz (2013), while the proofs for non-well-founded lan-
guages proceed roughly along the lines of Williamson (2010, Appendix 3). Call
the latter the ‘direct method’ and the former the ‘indirect method’. The direct
method is applicable to well-founded languages as well, and might even provide
simpler proofs. However, the indirect method gives us a way of constructing
Kripke models which are equivalent up to some modal depth but disagree on
the canonical sentence of a modalized quantifier; this makes it easy to see how
the result can be strengthened by enriching the language under consideration.
E.g., it is clear from this strategy that the result is not a↵ected by expanding
the language to include plural quantifiers. Plural quantifiers can also be ac-
commodated on the direct method, but how to do so is is less obvious. Beside
simplicity, the direct method has the advantage of not requiring us to char-
acterize the equivalence of models up to a given quantifier rank in terms of a
back-and-forth system. This need not be an obstacle to applying it to N11,
as back-and-forth systems have been developed for non-well-founded languages;
see Rantala (1979) and Karttunen (1979).
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